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Abstract
Using a dataset on bilateral trade ow at the industry-level from 1980 to 2006, I de-
termine the inuence of the industry nancial composition on the export ow between
a developing country, Pakistan, and its trading partners. Firms undertaking exporting
activities may need to fund their investments from external sources of nances such
as bank loans. The degree of nancial dependence and asset tangibility of an industry
can determine their ability to obtain external nance. Hence, the nancial composition
is likely to inuence the value of export ow. I split the group of importing countries
according to their level of nancial development and whether they face episodes of
banking crisis in order to determine the inuence of industry nancial composition
under di¤erent macroeconomic environments. In addition, although the South Asian
economies have similar characteristics in terms of the level of nancial and economic
development, Pakistan has a greater presence of larger domestic banks and foreign
banks that are likely to prefer lending to rms that exhibit better characteristics that
promise higher returns. Pakistan also records on average a higher level of banking
credit than its neighboring countries for the time period considered reecting its nan-
cial depth. I consider whether nancial dependence and asset tangibility inuence the
ratio of total export ow from Pakistan to total export ow from South Asian countries
at the industry-level in order to determine the impact of industry nancial composition
on the regional signicance of industry-level export ow from Pakistan.
Email: aadilnakhoda@gmail.com. I apologize for any error or omission and I assume responsibility for
the content of this paper. I look forward to any feedback and comments.
1 Introduction
Financial factors of an industry such as nancial dependence and asset tangibility are likely to
inuence the pattern of international trade. The development of nancial markets, measured
in terms of the depth of credit within an economy, determines the ability of the economy
to accumulate the supply of credit provided by banks to the private sector and in turn
determines the extent of the inuence of nancial factors on international trading patterns
within a country. As participation in international trade may require traders to borrow in
order to fund production, traders may need to rely on the nancial markets to increase their
international trading activities. Traders in one economy may take advantage of lower cost of
nancing in another economy. For instance, importers located in a country with relatively
developed nancial markets may obtain credit relatively easily compared to producers located
in a country with relatively less developed nancial markets allowing the producers to sell
to foreign customers that are able to nance their investments and purchases at a lower cost
of nancing than the domestic customers. In other words, exporters in the less developed
economy can be nanced by lenders or importers in a more developed economy and enjoy
lower costs of nancing for the trade opportunities relative to producers that sell only for the
domestic market. In addition, nancial characteristics at the industry-level such as nancial
dependence and asset tangibility are likely to vary the degree of access to nance and costs of
nancing due to the presence of credit risk within an economy. Therefore, the development
of the nancial market inuences the growth of investment across industries with varying
degrees of nancial dependence and asset tangibility as it lowers the risk of providing credit
faced by the lenders and lowers nancing costs for borrowers. The study of the e¤ect of
nancial factors on international trading patterns is the focal point of this paper.
Episodes of nancial uncertainty that reduce the availability of funds for the borrowers
may also determine the inuence of nancial factors on trading patterns. Producers in in-
dustries that are likely to incur a greater proportion of their nancing from external funds
can be sensitive to the shortage of availability of nance necessary to fund their production
as well as producers that hold smaller proportion of tangible assets that can be collater-
alizable. An expectation in the failure of nancial institutions to honor deposits may lead
to considerable nancial distress that could culminate into instances of bank runs by bor-
rowers, bank liquidation and output loss. Such shocks to the economy can be interpreted
as episodes of banking crises, where nancial distress is often accompanied by signicant
policy intervention from the central bank in order to control for the negative consequences.
A banking crisis is likely to determine the level of growth rate for investments in industries
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based on the level of nancial dependence and asset tangibility. In this paper, I undertake a
study to determine whether episodes of banking crises faced by an importing partner and its
level of nancial depth is likely to impact the inuence of industry nancial compostion on
the export ow from Pakistan, a country that exhibits less developed nancial markets than
observed within many advanced and developed trading partners but has never itslef faced a
banking crisis.
1.1 Literature Review
Financial dependence is calculated as the fraction of capital expenditure nanced by external
funds instead of internal sources of nance, such as cash ow. The seminal paper of Rajan and
Zingales (1998) relates economic growth with nancial dependence under di¤erent conditions
of nancial development and determines that industries which rely more on external sources
of nance tend to grow disproportionately faster in countries that have nancially developed
markets. Beck and Greenberg (2003) incorporates export ow into the model of Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and determines that well developed nancial systems play an important role
to promote exports as large up-front xed costs required for exports are easier to nance.
I focus on the relationship between export ow and industry nancial characteristics as I
vary the development of nancial markets in the importing country in order to determine
whether nancially dependent industries generate greater exports to importing countries
with di¤erent levels of development in their nancial markets.
Asset tangibility measures the proportion of net property, plant and equipment in the
total assets of a rm. Braun (2003) incorporates the level of asset tangibility into the Rajan
and Zingales (1998) model as it determines whether countries with lower levels of nancial
development are likely to be characterized by investments in industries that have a higher
proportion of tangible assets to total assets. This relationship can be explained by the theory
that the degree of asset tangibility within an industry can determine the ability of a lender
to seize tangible assets in case of default payments by the borrower. Almeida and Campello
(2007) links nancial dependence of a rm with its asset tangibility and determines that rms
with lower asset tangibility are more likely to be nancially constrained. In other words, an
increase in asset tangibility diminishes the inuence of nancial constraints. Manova (2008)
correlates liberalization of equity markets with the development of nancial markets and
nds that developed nancial markets are likely to promote growth of rms in industries
with lower levels of asset tangibility. Besedes et al (2012), on the other hand, suggests that
higher asset tangibility can imply greater risk for rms, particularly in their initial years, as
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it may potentially increase the size of collateral that can be seized by lenders due to failure
of repayment of loans by the borrowers. Lower levels of nancial development and poorer
law enforcement may mitigate the probability of rm survival and counter the e¤ect of asset
tangibility on nancial constraints and instead reduce the willingness of rms to borrow.
As credit constraints can inuence international trade, the exporters in one industry can
be disproportionately a¤ected by the level of nancial dependence and the impact of the
credit constraints can be amplied when the importing country faces a credit crunch during
episodes of nancial crisis. Manova (2012) determines the role of credit constraints as it
distorts trade ow in industries that have di¤erent needs of external nancing and possess
di¤erent levels of collateralizable assets across countries that vary in the level of nancial de-
velopment. Chor and Manova (2012) considers the role of credit constraints on international
trade during the 2008-2009 global banking crisis. The e¤ects of the global crisis is stronger
in industries that require greater external nancing or have fewer collateralizable assets as
imports to the United States were signicantly reduced in such industries. Using interbank
rates to determine the level of tightness in the credit markets, Chor and Manova (2012)
concludes that countries with higher interbank rates trade relatively less in industries that
require external nancing and trade relatively more in industries with greater collateralizable
assets. On the other hand, Levhcenko et al. (2010) determines little inuence of nancial
characteristics of industries on U.S. trade as nancial dependence and asset tangibility do
not observe the predicted pattern as expected in the regressions. It observes nancial depen-
dence to have a positive inuence and asset tangibility to have a negative inuence on both
exports and imports but the e¤ect is only signicant for asset tangibility implying that the
contribution of nancial factors to the trade collapse maybe limited. This pattern can be
inuential in determining trade patterns not only for the U.S. but also for other developed
nancial markets. However, this pattern of nancial characteristics on U.S. trade may not
imply a similar pattern for countries with weaker nancial systems as the U.S. has one of
the most nancially developed markets that can absorb shocks in a much e¤ective manner.
Chang and Ma (2005) studies the e¤ect of nancial crisis on imports and observes a
signicant fall in imports during the year of the crisis as well as subsequent years. Do and
Levchenko (2007) determines the correlation between the demand of external nance by
exports and the development of nancial markets, indicated by the credit to the private
sector by banks as a percentage of GDP, and concludes that the former has a positive and
a signicant inuence on the latter. Although, Do and Levchencko (2007) does include
a variable to account for the banking crisis in the regressions to determine whether the
occurrence of a banking crisis will lower the signicance of external demand of nance by
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exports, it does not determine whether a country that faces a banking crisis is likely to still
observe a signicant e¤ect of the industry nancial factors on its trading patterns.
Laeven and Valencia (2010) denes an occurance of an episod of banking crisis if there are
signicant signs of nancial distress in the banking system followed by signicant banking
policies as a response to mitigate the losses due to nancial distress. This denition of
banking crisis will involve initial shortages in liquidity as lending by nancial institution is
reduced and is reected in the contraction of output1. Braun and Larrain (2005) suggests
that the impact of the shortage in liquidity and contraction in output is more severe in
nancially dependent sectors and the e¤ect is magnied in industries with less tangible assets
and in countries with poorer accounting standards accompanied with lower levels of nancial
development. In addition, DellAriccia et al (2008) studies the e¤ect of banking crisis on
growth in terms of value addition, capital formation and number of rms in an industry and
suggests that the di¤erential e¤ect of a banking crisis is stronger in nancially dependent
industries in developing countries. Firms in developing countries are likely to have fewer
sources of external nance and can be exacerbated during a banking crisis as the limited
number of funding options are likely to be reduced. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)
determines that although lower GDP per capita does increase the likelihood of a banking
crisis, weaker macroeconomic environment accompanied by low GDP growth increases the
risk of a banking crisis. However, the costs of a banking crisis are likely to be higher in
countries which have a larger share of credit to the private sector.
On the other hand, Kroszner et al (2006) determines that the impact of the nancial
crisis is stronger in nancially dependent industries in developed countries as they are likely
to borrow more in pre-crisis periods relative to nancially dependent industries in developing
countries. This creates a greater exposure of nancial credit and a negative e¤ect on the
growth rates compared to industries within shallower nancial systems. However, the devel-
oped economies are likely to recover from a nancial crisis faster than developing economies
and in turn reduce the impact on output in the long term compared to a developing econ-
omy. Furceri and Zdzienicka (2009) considers the inuence of nancial crisis on Central and
Eastern European countries and nds that the long term e¤ects of a nancial crisis on the
deterioration of output is stronger in the economies that have experienced excessivegrowth
in their credit markets. Such economies may have undertaken unsustainable credit expansion
that could lead to nancial instability and may have borrowers that may lack the capacity
1Governments may intervene by injecting liquidity through a bank recapitalization process in order to
correct the shortage of credit resulting from the banking crisis. However, borrowers that have increased their
leverage substantially during pre-crisis period may lose condence in the nancial institutions as a result of
the crisis, and the lack of demand may reduce the amount of credit provided by the banking sector.
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to absorb nancial shocks relative to borrowers in developed economies in the long term.
The lack of information on borrowers in weak nancial markets can dominate the decision-
making of the lenders. A credit crunch as a result of a banking crisis can have a devastating
e¤ect on the exporters from developing nancial markets as providing credit to exporters
in such markets by lenders located in developed nancial markets may be considered riskier
than providing credit to their domestic borrowers. Financial institutions may prefer to
reduce their exposure to borrowers in order to limit the negative e¤ect of uncertainties that
are prevalent during a crisis, particularly if the borrowers are located in exceptionally less
developed nancial markets. Berman and Martin (2012) considers the e¤ect of nancial crisis
in the importing countries on the exports from sub-Saharan African countries and determines
that the e¤ect is negative on exports from the region. In addition, it also determines that
the e¤ect on the exports from the region is signicantly greater compared to other regions
as exporters from sub-Saharan African countries are likely to face the decline in the exports
due to both income e¤ect as well as disruption e¤ect. The former takes place as the richer
importing countries are less likely to import goods from sub-Saharan African countries during
a crisis. On the other hand, the latter takes place as a result of the fall in trade which is
independent from the fall in income of importing countries. For instance, lack of availability
of trade nance during a banking crisis has been considered as a major determinant in the
decline in exports from the sub-Saharan African region. I intend to study the inuence of
industry nancial composition on export ow from Pakistan to countries with varying levels
of nancial development. Although, South Asian countries have weakly developed nancial
markets, the level of nancial development is on average ranked higher than that observed in
sub-Saharan African countries. Therefore, the pattern predicted for Pakistan may di¤er from
that observed in sub-Saharan African countries as lenders in developed nancial markets may
lend to borrowers in Pakistan if they believe that certain industries are likely to grow as the
importing country faces a banking crisis.
To the best of my knowledge, I conduct the rst study on the e¤ect of the nancial
composition of industries on export ow from Pakistan to its trading partners based on the
level of development of nancial markets in the importing countries as well as episodes of
banking crisis faced by the importing country. The study is also unique as it determines the
e¤ect of industry nancial composition on the export patterns originating from a developing
country. I include a dependent variable that is calculated as a ratio of export ow from
Pakistan to the total export ow from South Asian economies as they are similar in terms of
the development of their nancial markets. Pakistan records the highest average percentage
of domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of its GDP over the time
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period considered, indicating the level of development of the nancial market within South
Asia. Pakistan also has a greater presence of larger domestic banks and foreign banks that
are likely to prefer to lend to rms which exhibit better rm-level characterisitics, such as
exporting rms. Hence, the inuence of the nancial factors at the industry-level on the
ratio of exports from Pakistan to the total exports from South Asian economies may reveal
a preference of exports in certain industries and the inuence of this ratio may vary with the
level of banking credit as well as by the episodes of banking crises faced by the importing
country.
2 Theoretical Discussion
2.1 Linking Financial Institutions with Exporters
Amiti and Weinstein (2009) determines that there is a negative e¤ect from the health of
nancial institutions on exporting rms during a banking crisis. Exporters are likely to
be sensitive to the availability of nancing options due to their larger xed and sunk costs
required to enter the export market as well as the need for higher working capital in order to
nance production of the exported goods relative to rms that produce only for the domestic
market. The seminal paper of Myers and Majluf (1984) points out that the better performing
rms, such as the exporting rms, are likely to prefer internal funds ( i.e. retained earnings)
to nance their investment needs and will only seek external nancing if the internal funds
are not su¢ cient. As exporting activities may require large up-front payments from internal
sources to nance xed and sunk costs related to entering a new market, it is likely that
exporters will demand external funds to nance the production activities and purchase the
necessary xed assets. Exporters from developing countries with weaker nancial systems
are likely to request nance from lenders located in a relatively developed nancial market or
borrow from large domestic nancial institutions that have su¢ cient funds to nance their
investments. Larger banks with greater reserves to nance large investments and their ability
to monitor loans more e¢ ciently are likely to be preferred source of lending for exporters.
Financial integration has promoted ow of funds from lenders in developed nancial markets
to borrowers in less developed nancial markets that are characterized by riskier investments
but compensated with a higher rate of return2. Lenders in relatively more developed markets
2According to Claessens et al (2008), even if the foreign banks with headquarters in developing countries
may have a larger proportion of subsidiaries, their proportion of assets is likely to be signicantly lower than
the assets of foreign banks with headquarters in developed countries. Hence, the inuence of foreign banks
from developed countries can be signicantly larger relative to the foreign banks from developing countries.
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may provide loans to borrowers in less developed markets where repayments are made in
terms of the value of exported goods which is exchanged between the borrower and the
lender3.Similarly, as exporters are likely to be more productive and observe better rm-level
characteristics, large domestic banks may target such rms.
Iacoviello and Minetti (2010) determines the importance of foreign lenders to domestic
borrowers, particularly exporting rms, as foreign lenders with their larger reserves and more
e¢ cient monitoring of investments compared to domestic lenders can provide borrowers with
greater productivity and output. On the other hand, rms that borrow from foreign lenders
tend to be larger and are more likely export. Hence, there is a natural hierarchy in terms of
the size of the borrowers and the lenders as foreign lenders will more likely lend to exporters
rather than non-exporters in other countries, while exporting rms are likely to borrow from
foreign lenders. This natural hierarchy also holds for relatively larger domestic lenders as
they seek protable lending opportunities.
Goldberg et al (2000) lists some arguments in favor and against foreign bank participation
in the local nancial markets. It points out that although foreign lenders may increase the
amount of funding available to domestic borrowers to nance their projects that otherwise
may be nancially constrained, foreign lenders may also cherry pickthe best performing
borrowers and leave the riskier borrowers to the domestic lenders. Detragiache et al (2008)
points out the role of foreign lenders in cream-skimmingas such lenders are likely to lend
to better performing rms with greater growth opportunities and benet rms with hard
information rather than soft information. As foreign lenders based in more developed
nancial markets and larger domestic lenders are likely to lend in nancially dependent
industries as the capacity of rms to borrow is higher, export growth is likely to be observed
in such industries. Choudhury (2010) determines the importance of development banks in
India that are similar to large domestic banks to fund rms in nancially dependent industries
with their specialized nancial services aimed to promote growth. However, foreign lenders
may not have hardinformation on rms, which is determined by the proportion of tangible
assets owned by a typical rm, in an industry compared to domestic lenders. In addition,
larger domestic lenders with their larger size of pool of borrowers may not prefer to monitor
borrowers with soft information. In summary, due to imperfect capital markets and the
resultant credit friction, foreign and larger domestic lenders are likely to lend to rms that
belong to industries characterized with higher level of asset tangibility4.
3To simplify the model, I assume that every industry produces exportable goods and the lenders expect
to be repaid in terms of tradable goods. As I consider manufacturing industries only, it is likely that majority
of the goods produced are tradable goods.
4Although, I assume nancial mobility between countries, capital markets are assumed to be imperfect.
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Mian (2006), using an extensive dataset on the Pakistani banking system that links
borrower characteristics with lender characteristics at the loan-level, determines foreign
lenders relative to domestic lenders are likely to nance borrowers in Pakistan that are
less monitoring-intensive and have hard information about their characteristics. On the
other hand, when the importing countries face a banking crisis, lenders reduce their sup-
ply of credit to domestic borrowers. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) suggests that
lenders in countries facing a banking crisis are likely to hedge some of their risk by lending
to countries that do not face a banking crisis. With the assumption that large domestic
lenders are also likely to own assets in nancially developed markets, such lenders may also
be a¤ected by the banking crisis. Consequently, the banking crisis can have an adverse e¤ect
on the nancially dependent industries that the larger lenders are otherwise willing to lend
during non-crisis periods. Given the supply of credit and the development of the nancial
markets, lenders may nance rms with lower levels of asset tangibility located in countries
that do not face a banking crisis as such industries are relatively safer and provide protable
opportunities for investments than the domestic industries with similar characteristics.
In order to incorporate the role of an importer into this model and follow a hierarchical
structure, a larger lender nances a domestic borrower who is likely to be an exporter and
vice-versa. Exporting rms are typically larger and better performing in terms of sales than
rms that sell only to the domestic market. Partial revenues from sales will be collected
by the larger lender as payments for debt servicing. An exporter can sell his output to
countries with di¤erent levels of nancial development but will maximize revenue by selling
to countries that provide highest returns in terms of value for the given xed and sunk
costs. After the demand of the product sold by the exporter has been met by the importers
in countries that provide the maximum returns, the exporter can sell its products to other
countries after paying the related xed and sunk costs to enter the market. During a banking
crisis in the home country, lenders may fund exporters located in foreign countries that are
relatively less a¤ected by the nancial volatility, particularly in industries sensitive to a
banking crisis, as importers in the home country can instead purchase inputs produced
previously by themselves from producers in countries where volatility is lower. This provides
an opportunity to nance exporters in countries where otherwise rms would not be provided
nancing due to the softnature of tangible assets available within the industry.
In addition, as Pakistan has attracted foreign lenders and has a greater presence of large
Similar to large domestic banks, foreign lenderes are likely to have transactional based lending to its borrow-
ers, where hardinformation on the borrowers (such as information on size of tangible assets) is generally
pre¤ered.
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banks relative to other South Asian economies, the inuence of lenders on borrowers will be
greater in Pakistan relative to the inuence of lenders on borrowers in other South Asian
economies. According to Claessens et al (2008), about 23% of total assets in the banking
sector were owned by foreign banks in Pakistan in 2005, compared to 9% in Nepal and
5% in India. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have placed restrictions on the entry of foreign
banks. Similarly, translating market share into market power, Musleh-ud-Din and Khwaja
(2006) reports that the ve largest banks in Pakistan contributed 77% to the market share
of deposits in 1999. Barth et al (2001) reports that the ve largest banks in India and
Nepal contributed 42% and 55% to the market share of deposits in 1999. The foreign
and the domestic borrowers in Pakistan had relatively greater inuence on the nancial
market than the foreign and domestic lenders in India and Nepal. Greater credit depth in
a country creates greater potentials for lenders as the nances provided tend to be more
secured and outcome more predictable. Therefore, the larger lenders that contribute to the
greater nancial depth may prefer to lend to exporters in nancially dependent industries.
In turn, exporters may prefer to export to nancially developed markets as such exports
can provide greater export value than exports to less nancially developed markets that
may not su¢ ciently provide the export potential needed to nance the costs of borrowing.
The ratio of exports from Pakistan to total exports from South Asian economies will be
negatively inuenced by nancial dependence within low banking credit countries as exports
to these countries will be relatively concentrated in less nancially dependent industries. On
the other hand, the relatively greater presence of foreign lenders in Pakistan will inuence
exporters in industries characterized by greater asset tangibility to increase their export ow.
3 Data
In Appendix A, I list the denition and source of each variable used in the regressions.
The data on export ow is borrowed from de Sousa et al. (2012), which is listed on the
CEPIIs website. The values of nancial dependence, asset tangibility, capital intensity,
human capital intensity and natural resource intensity at the industry-level is originally
listed in Braun (2003) and borrowed from Manova (2008). The data on contract intensity of
each industry is borrowed from Nunn (2007) and the import demand elasticities from Nicita
and Olarreaga (2006) and Kee et al (2008).
In Appendix B, the countries are sorted according to their OECD membership status
and high, middle and low level of banking credit. In Appendix B, I have also listed the
countries that are considered as lower middle income countries by the World Bank. I clas-
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sify Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as South Asian
economies.
In addition to splitting the group of countries according to their OECD membership
status, countries have been split according to high, middle and low banking credit5. Using
the average banking credit, which is calculated as the mean of domestic credit provided by
banking sector (% of GDP) for the importing countries over the time period, the degree of
banking credit is classied according to the 75th (between 103.16% & 266.93%) and 25th
(-26.62% and 30.19%) percentile of average bank credit of all importers for high banking
credit importers and low banking credit importers respectively. Average banking credit of
Pakistan (at 49.15%) would rank it amongst countries with middle banking credit. With
domestic credit provided by banking sector being considered as an indicator for the level of
development of the nancial markets as it determines the level of nancial depth within the
country, Pakistan has a nancial market that is more developed than the nancianl markets
in low banking credit countries but less developed than the nancial markets in high banking
credit countries. It is also important to note that the banking credit has only been included
for those years for which an importing country is a trading partner of Pakistan as this will
remove any variations in the level of banking credit that may occur when the country is
closed to imports from Pakistan.
4 Empirics
In Tables 1, 3, 5 and 7, I have considered the ow of exports from Pakistan to its trading
partner as the dependent variable. In Tables 2, 4, 6 and 8, I have considered the export
ow from Pakistan as a ratio to the total export ow from all South Asian economies to
the respective trading partner of Pakistan. Although, South Asian economies have nancial
markets that are similar in the level of development, Pakistan observes one of the highest
average banking credit for the period considered within the region. The purpose of this
dependent variable is to determine whether nancial characteristics are likely to increase
the relative export ow from Pakistan as the relatively stronger nancial markets within
Pakistan may promote exports relative to other South Asian economies particularly when
5Although, all OECD member countries have either high or middle banking credit, none of the OECD
member countries have low banking credit. On the other hand, not all high banking credit countries are
OECD member countries. As there are several non OECD countries with high banking credit, OECD
membership status may not be the best indicator for the development of nancial markets. Therefore, the
sample is also split according to the level of banking credit.
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the importing partners are facing a banking crisis6. The regressions for Tables 1,3 and 5 can
be stated as:
lnExportF lowijt = 1Findepi + 2Tangi + 3Zi + j + t + "ijt (Equation 1)
where ExportF lowijt is the export ow from Pakistan to its trading partner, Findepi
is the variable accounting for the nancial dependence at the industry-level, Tangi is the
asset tangibility at the industry-level. Zi is industry-level controls such as contract intensity,
capital intensity, human capital intensity, natural resource intensity and import demand
elasticity. To account for unobserved e¤ects in the model, I include j as the country xed
e¤ect, t as the time xed e¤ect. "ijt is the error term which is distributed as "ijt~N(0; 1):
The notations i; /j and t dene industry, country and year respectively7. In addition, although
not reported for the regressions below, the F-statistics reject the hypothesis that year and
country xed e¤ects are zero and strongly supports their inclusion. The industries are
classied using ISIC Revision 2. In Tables 2, 4, 6 and 8, the regression equation is similar
except that the dependent variable is a ratio of Pakistans export to the total exports of all
South Asian economies to the particular importing country. Using the export ow as the
dependent variable is similar to the concept introduced in Rajan and Zingales (1998), which
uses growth rate in real value added for each industry as a dependent variable. I adopt a
strategy similar to Chor and Manova (2012) which implements US imports at the industry-
level and Manova (2012) which implements bilateral exports between trading partners as
their dependent variables to study the correlation between international trade and nancial
factors.
The inclusion of importing country and year xed e¤ects can reduce issues related to the
omitted variable bias that may otherwise occur as importing country and year characteris-
tics can inuence trading patterns. As the variables accounting for nancial dependence and
6Exports from Pakistan constitute a small percentage of total GDP and exports to any single trading
partner is a much smaller percentage. It is unlikely that exports by itself will inuence the development of
the nancial markets in Pakistan. Therefore, we can assume that the development of the nancial markets
has an exogenous e¤ect on the trading patterns of Pakistan.
7During the 1990s, there was an increase in the prominence of trade from other South Asian economies,
particularly India, that signicantly reduced relative exports from Pakistan. Other South Asian economies
also had evolving nancial markets that promoted exports which could also have been accompanied by factors
at the industry-level, such as subsidies and trade promotion policies. This e¤ect may be di¢ cult to control
as a country specic industry-level variable in the regression that uses a dependent variable which sums up
the trade from all South Asian countries. Inclusion of the variable accounting for export patterns of lower
middle income economies may help to mitigate some of this e¤ect as the variable may be determined by the
policies undertaken in general across countries with similar income levels.
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asset tangibility are borrowed from the US data, endogeneity between export ow and the
independent variables is not considered a major issue in the above model. It is unlikely that
trade ow between Pakistan and its trading partners is likely to have any inuence on the
values of the nancial indicators of industries in the importing country as the export ow
from Pakistan will only be a small percentage of total trade ow, domestic and foreign, for
an industry. The nancial indicators will not be a¤ected by any shocks to the development
of nancial markets within Pakistan as the values are borrowed from the US data. Further,
with the US considered as one of the most nancially developed country, the values for the
nancial indicators are likely to be stable and can be adopted to create a similar ranking
of industries based on the characteristics across other countries8. The simple assumption is
that the nancial factors of industries are inuenced by level of demand and characteristics of
the industries instead of country characteristics as borrowers in a domestic country are free
to borrow funds from foreign sources but not necessarily free to move factors of production
between countries. Financial characteristics at the industry-level can hence be considered
uniform across countries. The group is split on the basis of country-level indicators, such as
OECD membership status, level of banking credit and whether a country faced a banking
crisis during a particular year. This splitting of the group introduces an exogenous variation
as it is unlikely that industry-level nancial characteristics will directly inuence country-
level indicators. The export ow between Pakistan and an importing country is not likely to
be signicant to inuence country-level characteristics such as the development of the nan-
cial markets and the occurrence of a banking crisis in the importing country. Even though
the exports from Pakistan may signicantly decline during the period the importing country
faces a banking crisis, it is not likely that the decline in the export ow between Pakistan
and the importing country is the cause for the banking crisis. This can be ascertained by the
fact that the absolute value of correlation between industry-level and country-level indicators
is less than 10%. In addition, the multicollinearity that would lead to high correlation be-
tween the independent variables used in the regressions is also not a concern as the variance
ination factor does not exceed more than 10 for the independent variables. The standard
errors are clustered at the importing country-level as export ow to a particular importing
country can be correlated.
One of the major reasons for a banking crisis is the oversupply of banking credit within
an economy in the period preceding the crisis. As noted in Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999),
the domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP (gross domestic
product) follows a boom and bust pattern in advance of a crisis and then falls during a bank-
8For this reason, trade ow between the United States and Pakistan has not been considered.
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ing crisis. Further, a banking crisis also results in lower output levels that may negatively
a¤ect GDP. With banking credit and GDP both falling, it is di¢ cult to predict the intensity
of the boom and the bust of the domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a per-
centage of GDP. Therefore, although the episodes of banking crisis may lower the absolute
value of the domestic credit provided by the banking sector, it may be independent from the
domestic credit provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP. However, as banking
crisis is related to loss of output, it can be used as a suitable indicator for a fall in demand of
exports from Pakistan as it inhibits the ability of the importing country to purchase foreign
goods. Though, as discussed earlier, the e¤ect of the banking crisis can only be exogenously
related to the export ow from Pakistan and the industry nancial characteristics.
5 Results
5.1 Discussion on Figures
In Figure 1, I observe an overall decline in the annual average real value of bilateral exports
from Pakistan at the industry-level between 1980 and 2006. An increase in the number of
industries that exported over time and lower export value growth rates relative to the ination
rate in Pakistan may have attributed to this decline. In Figures 2 and 3, nancial dependence
and asset tangibility have both been a¤ected by the nancial liberalization program that
started in 1988. As the government allowed private banks to operate in the country, loans
for product development and participation in international trade may have become easier to
avail and in turn helped to increase the exports in industries that are nancially dependent.
The spike and the subsequent sharp decline in nancial dependence and asset tangibility
respectively can be a result of an increase in the number of exporters as nancial liberalization
may have allowed rms to undertake activities that were previously constrained by their
inability to nance their investments. In addition, the pattern does exhibit more volatility
towards non OECD countries. On the other hand, a prominent decline in the asset tangibility
of industries exporting to non OECD countries around the time period Pakistan experienced
liberalization in its nancial sector can be attributed to the presence of greater availability of
sources of external nancing as banks were relatively more willing to fund industries which
were characterized with a low level of asset tangibility or with soft information. As the
e¤ect of the shock from nancial liberalization subsided, the average nancial characteristics
rebounded to their original levels.
In Figures 4, 5 and 6, I observe a similar pattern to Figures 1, 2 and 3. In Figure 4, the
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average real value of exports to countries with high, middle and low banking credit observe a
similar trend as the real value of bilateral exports to OECDmember and non OECD countries
respectively. Similarly, in Figures 5 and 6 there is a similar trend of nancial characteristics
as in Figures 2 and 3. Although, the direction of the real value of bilateral exports and
nancial characteristics is similar across both OECD member and non OECD countries as
well as high, middle and low banking credit countries, the volatility in the numbers is greater
in non OECD countries and middle and low banking credit countries than OECD members
and high banking credit countries. This is consistent with the literature that states the
volatility in production patterns as a result of a banking crisis is expected to be higher in
developing countries. An increase in average nancial dependence and a decrease in average
asset tangibility of all the industries within the country should indicate an improvement
in the capability of rms to participate in international trade. Therefore, I predict that
bilateral export value will be positively associated with nancial dependence and negatively
associated with asset tangibility.
In Figure 7, the average of the ratio of bilateral exports from Pakistan to total bilat-
eral exports from South Asia declines for both OECD member and non OECD countries,
with a sharper decline observed in early 1990s. This sharper decline can be attributed to
liberalization of trade in India as Indian exports started to dominate total exports from the
South Asian region. The ratio for non OECD countries declined from a peak of more than
0.5 to about 0.15, while the ratio for OECD members declined from a peak of 0.25 to less
than 0.1. In Figure 8, I observe a similar pattern to that observed in Figure 7 as there is a
decline in the ratio for both high banking credit countries as well as middle and low banking
credit countries. As expected, the decline in the average real value of bilateral exports is
accompanied by the decline in the average of the ratio of Pakistans exports to South Asias
total exports and that the shift in the composition of the nancial characteristics of exports
may inuence this decline.
In Appendix C.1, I sort the industries according to the size of exports. The top 5
exporting industries by export value for Pakistan are the manufacture of textiles, wearing
apparel, food industries, leather and petroleum products.
In Appendix D.1, I observe a positive correlation between the ranking of exports by value
from Pakistan and the ratio of exports from Pakistan to the sum of exports from South Asian
economies. The industries that rank high in terms of export value also rank high in terms
of the ratio. Therefore, Pakistan may have a comparative advantage against its South Asian
neighbors in the production of goods in industries that rank high in terms of export value.
In Appendix E.1 and Appendix E.2, export ow from Pakistan falls when the importing
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country faces a banking crisis but export ow from Pakistan as a ratio of total exports
from South Asian economies increases. The average of the bilateral exports from Pakistan
is more than 30% greater during the periods when importing countries are not facing a
banking crisis against the periods when importing countries are facing a banking crisis. The
results hold across all categories of countries, regardless of OECD membership status and
banking credit. Even though exports from Pakistan may fall during periods of banking
crisis, exports from Pakistan are likely to be relatively preferred during such periods9. In
Appendix E.3 and Appendix E.4 , the industry-level composition of exports based on the
nancial characteristics, although small, increases in nancial dependence and decreases
in asset tangibility for periods an importing country does not face a banking crisis. The
average nancial dependence and asset tangibility is calculated on the basis of the number
of industries that export during a period. This may result in a lower average when the number
of industries that export, due to the demand-side e¤ects, is higher. During a banking crisis,
the decline in domestic output from nancially dependent industries and industries with
lower asset tangibility may generate some import demand from such industries in countries
that do not face a banking crisis to substitute domestic production, resulting in an increase
in average nancial dependence and a decrease in asset tangibility at the industry-level. This
direction in the average nancial dependence and asset tangibility across the level of nancial
development of importing countries explains that the pattern of the nancial composition of
exporting industries from Pakistan to importing countries with di¤ering levels of nancial
development.
The above gures reveal a pattern for the export ow between Pakistan and its trading
partners and for the ratio of exports from Pakistan to the total exports from South Asian
economies. There is a decline in both values from 1980 to 2006. Financial dependence has
shown an upward trend in the late 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, asset tangibility
has shown a downward trend in the late 1980s and 1990s. The trend has been more volatile
for non OECD countries and countries with low and middle banking credit than for OECD
countries and and countries with high banking credit respectively. The trend on the annual
banking credit observed in Appendix F.1 can relate to the trend of industry-level nancial
dependence and asset tangibility, as the banking credit in Pakistan had a slight upward trend
till late 1990s and then crashed in 199810. In addition, countries that have faced a banking
9OECD membership status and the level of banking credit as well as the episodes of banking crisis
in importing countries are all assumed to be exogenous to the export ow from Pakistan. Exports from
Pakistan, as it may account for only a small percentage of total imports to its trading partner, is not likely
to inuence country-level characteristics of its trading partner.
10The fall in banking credit in 1998 can be attributed to the nuclear tests that were conducted in May
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crisis have slightly favored exports from industries that are nancially dependent but with
lower asset tangibility.
The level of domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP in
Pakistan has remained relatively constant between 40% and 60% from 1980 to 2006. Other
South Asian countries have grown in their level of domestic credit between this time period.
The gures above reveal average export values and nancial composition across countries and
does not explain the e¤ect of the industry nancial composition on the export ow as well as
the ratio of exports from Pakistan relative to total exports from the South Asian economies
within importing countries with certain country-level characteristics. The inuence of the
industry nancial composition on the export ow can have a di¤ering e¤ect within countries
with varying country-level characteristics after controlling for certain industry e¤ects such
as contract intensity and factor intensities. I aim to determine the inuence of the nancial
characteristics of at the industry-level on the export ow and the ratio of exports from Pak-
istan to the total exports from South Asian economies within an importing country for a
given year. I include country-level and year xed e¤ects and certain industry controls in the
regressions listed below. The group of countries is divided according to the various measures
of economic development and development of nancial markets, using OECD membership
status and level of bank credit respectively. In addition, the inuence of the nancial factors
on export ow and ratio of exports can di¤er when importing countries face a certain period
of banking crisis. This will determine whether the relationship between nancial charac-
teristics and export pattern di¤ers across countries at di¤erent levels of economic, nancial
development and experience a shortage of banking credit through their crisis.
5.2 Discussion on Tables
In Table 1, the bilateral export ow from Pakistan is positively associated with nancial
dependence for the pooled set of countries, OECD member and non OECD countries at 1%
level, 10% level, and 5% level of signicance respectively. It is also positively associated
with asset tangibility within the set of OECD member countries at 5% level of signicance.
The developed OECD member countries are likely to demand exports from industries that
also provide higher levels of asset tangibility. As larger lenders are likely to provide loans
to exporters that belong to industries with a greater proportion of tangible assets or with
hardinformation, export ow to OECD member countries is likely to increase as the asset
tangibility of such industries increases. Contract intensity is negatively associated with
1998, which lead to subsequent sanctions being imposed on the nancial market in Pakistan. This fall in
banking liquidity has been discussed in Khwaja and Mian (2008).
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bilateral exports but signicant at 1% level for all three set of countries. This can imply that
all countries are likely to import goods from Pakistan that are available in a spot market
rather than require a contractual agreement. The weaker legal framework characterized in
Pakistan can result in trade in the less contract intensive industries, but nancially dependent
industries are likely to positively inuence export ow from Pakistan.
Capital intensity is negative and signicant at 5% level and 1% level within pooled
countries and OECD member countries respectively. The export ow of Pakistan to OECD
member countries is likely to be labor intensive. Human capital intensity and natural resource
intensity are both negatively associated and signicant at the 1% level with export ow.
Import demand elasticity is negative and signicant at the 1% level for OECD member
countries but at 5% level for the pooled countries and non OECD countries. The negative
e¤ect of import demand elasticity suggests that exports are likely to be price sensitive as the
percentage decrease in quantity imported is greater than the percentage increase in import
price. Lastly, the sum of exports from lower middle income countries is likely to be positive
and signicant at 1% level for all set of countries. This indicates that the value of sum of
exports from lower middle income countries is positively associated with export ow from
Pakistan, proving the complementary nature of exports from lower middle income countries
and export ow from Pakistan.
In Table 2, I substitute the dependent variable in Table 1, the bilateral export ow
with the ratio of bilateral exports from Pakistan to the total bilateral exports from South
Asia. Financial dependence is positive and signicant at the 1% level for OECD member
countries and at the 10% level for pooled countries. Foreign lenders that provide loans
to exporters in Pakistan have a relative greater inuence on the borrowers in nancially
dependent industries to export to OECD member countries compared to foreign lenders in
other South Asian economies. Asset tangibility is not signicant for any set of countries. The
lack of signicance of asset tangibility may indicate that lack of presence of collateral within
an industry does not inuence the preference of exports from Pakistan. Contract intensity
is negatively related with the ratio and signicant at 1% level for all set of countries.
Capital intensity is negative and signicant at 10% level for the pooled countries and
1% level for OECD member countries. Human capital intensity is negative and signicant
at 1% level for the pooled countries and non OECD countries. Natural resource intensity
is positive and signicant at 5% level for OECD member countries only, indicating that
Pakistans exports to OECD member countries are likely to be natural resource intensive
than exports from other South Asian economies. Import demand elasticity is negative and
signicant at 1% level across the group of countries, implying that exports from Pakistan
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are concentrated in industries that are likely to be sensitive to the increase in prices relative
to exports from other South Asian economies. Import demand elasticity helps to control for
any biases that may result on the ratio of exports from Pakistan due to di¤erences in import
tari¤s as a result of trade agreements on goods exported from other economies in South Asia
that may inuence the price of the exported good. In addition, sum of exports from lower
middle income economies negatively inuences the exports from Pakistan relative to exports
from South Asian economies for the pooled countries and non OECD countries at 1% level
of signicance. This variable is positive for OECD countries at 5% level of signicance. As
cumulative exports of South Asian economies are relatively large and likely to contribute a
greater proportion to the sum of exports from lower middle economies, an increase in the
sum of exports from lower middle income economies could imply less exports from Pakistan
as a ratio to exports from South Asian economies. However, exports from Pakistan have a
complementary nature related to exports from lower middle economies and are likely to be
preferred over exports from other South Asian economies by the importers in OECD member
countries.
In Table 3, nancial dependence is positive and signicant at 1% level for countries with
middle level banking credit. Asset tangibility is not signicant for any set of countries. Fi-
nancial dependence inuences exports from Pakistan to middle level banking credit countries,
which can exhibit similar levels of nancial development as Pakistan, but asset tangibility
at the industry-level has no inuence on export ow from Pakistan in high, middle and low
banking credit countries. Contract intensity is negative and signicant at 1% level across all
set of countries. Capital intensity is negative and signicant at 1% level for countries with
high banking credit. Human capital intensity and natural resource intensity are negative
and signicant at 1% level for all set of countries, while import demand elasticity is negative
and signicant at 1% level for both high and low banking credit countries but signicant at
5% level for middle level banking credit countries. Sum of exports from middle lower income
level countries is positive and signicant at 1% level for all set of countries.
In Table 4, nancial dependence positively inuences the ratio of exports from Pakistan
relative to total exports from South Asian economies and is signicant at 1% and 5% level for
high and middle level banking credit countries respectively but negatively inuences the ratio
of exports from Pakistan and is signicant at 1% level for low banking credit countries. On
the other hand, asset tangibility positively inuences the ratio at 1% level of signicance for
low banking credit countries. The negative e¤ect of nancial dependence and the positive
e¤ect of asset tangibility is likely to indicate that countries with less developed nancial
markets are less likely to generate export value for exports from Pakistan relative to exports
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from other South Asian economies. As Pakistan has a relatively developed nancial market
within the South Asian economies, it is likely to attract foreign lenders from the developed
nancial markets that would prefer to invest in relatively less riskier markets. With foreign or
larger lenders preferring that exporters in nancially dependent industries in Pakistan export
to the developed nancial markets to generate a greater value for their exports, the nancial
dependence can negatively inuence the ratio of exports from Pakistan to total exports from
South Asian economies within low banking credit countries. With the assumption that the
larger lenders are relatively more inuential in Pakistan than other South Asian economies
and play a more signicant role in dictating the export ow, exporters are also likely to be
rms with a greater percentage of tangible assets due to the presence of hardinformation.
As shown in Appendix F.2, the average banking credit within Pakistan at 48% is higher
than the average banking credit within other South Asian nations, which makes the nancial
markets within Pakistan relatively more developed. Exporters that require greater external
nancing needs from Pakistan may be relatively more reluctant to export to markets where
importers do not have su¢ cient credit depth and do not provide the required export revenue
to make them a viable destination for their exports. In addition, the preference of exporters
from Pakistan to export in industries with high asset tangibility to countries with low banking
credit may explain the greater inuence of larger lenders, both domestic and foreign, in
Pakistan as exporters with softinformation on their assets are provided less funding relative
to similar rms in other South Asian economies. As I also observe in Table 1, larger lenders
are likely to lend to exporters with hardinformation on their assets which increases export
ow as well as relative export ow to other South Asian economies for rms in industries
with a greater proportion of tangible assets. Although negative, there is no signicance on
the inuence of asset tangibility in high and middle banking credit countries as the degree
of asset tangibility of industries may not be inuential in determining the pattern of exports
from Pakistan relative to total exports from South Asian economies to such trading partners.
Importers in high and middle banking credit countries may not di¤erentiate between the level
of asset tangibility of exporters across the South Asian economies.
In Table 4, contract intensity is negative and signicant at 1% level for high and middle
bank credit countries and signicant at 10% level for low bank credit countries. Capital
intensity is negative and signicant at 5% level for high bank credit countries, while human
capital intensity observes a similar e¤ect for middle and low bank credit countries. Natural
resource intensity is positive and signicant at 5% level for middle bank credit countries and
negative and signicant at 5% level for low bank credit countries. Import demand elasticity
is negative and signicant at 1% level for all three sets of countries, while the sum of exports
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from lower middle income countries is negative and signicant at 1% level for middle and
low bank credit countries.
The results observed in Table 4 set a pattern for the preference of exports from Pakistan
within the three di¤erent categories of countries based on the level of banking credit. For
instance, the preference of exports from Pakistan to high banking credit countries is not
inuenced by the asset tangibility of the industries and neither by human capital intensity,
natural resource intensity and sum of exports from lower middle income economies. However,
the preference of exports from Pakistan to middle bank credit countries is inuenced by all
variables except asset tangibility and capital intensity. On the other hand, the preference
of exports from Pakistan to low bank credit countries is inuenced by all variables except
capital intensity, while more interestingly, nancial dependence and asset tangibility show
an opposite sign to what is observed for the other categories of banking credit.
5.2.1 Including Banking Crisis
In Table 5, nancial dependence is positive and signicant at 1% level and 5% level for the
pooled countries and OECD countries not facing a banking crisis respectively. Financial
dependence is positive and signicant at 5% level for non OECD countries, regardless of
whether a country faces a crisis. Larger lenders are likely to lend to exporters in nan-
cially dependent industries that export to OECD member countries as such industries are
likely to experience growth and the larger lenders with their more e¢ cient monitoring of
bank loans are able to extract greater prots by lending out to such industries. As nan-
cially dependent industries experience a larger number of exporters and a higher growth rate
in exports, they are also likely to export to non OECD member countries. Exporters are
not likely to export to OECD member countries that face a banking crisis. Credit supply
from lenders that would normally contribute to lending in industries with potentially higher
growth rates is constrained during this period. In addition, the lack of demand for imports
within OECD member countries in nancially dependent industries will also reduce exports
in such industries. On the other hand, the non OECD countries are likely to demand exports
in nancially dependent industries regardless of whether they face a banking crisis. Financial
dependence is positively associated with export ow between Pakistan and non OECD coun-
tries regardless of whether the importing countries face a banking crisis11. Surplus export
11Pakistan belongs within the range of countries with middle level of banking credit (between 25th and
75th percentile). As majority of the non OECD countries belong within the range of countries with middle
and low banking credit, it is likely that Pakistan has similar or greater nancial depth relative to other non
OECD countries.
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revenue generated by exporting to OECD member countries can allow rms in nancially
dependent industries in Pakistan to export to non OECD member countries.
Asset tangibility is negative and signicant at 1% level for the pooled set of countries and
non OECD countries facing a banking crisis but is positive and signicant at 1% level for
OECD member countries not facing a banking crisis. Levchenko et al (2010) also determines
a negative and signicant e¤ect of asset tangibility on U.S. imports for the period between
the second quarters of 2008 and 2009 and the results can closely relate to the imports to other
developed nancial markets. As asset tangibility indicates the presence of collateralizable
assets in terms of hardinformation, a positive value is likely to promote exports in industries
where collateral is essential as foreign lenders are likely to lend to exporters that provide
hard information over soft information. In addition, it is also likely that in developed
economies, trade in intangible industries will be within domestic industries and between other
developed OECD member countries that can more easily support the nancing requirements
of industries with a higher proportion of intangible assets, reducing the demand of imports
within such industries from Pakistan. Aghion et al (2008) shows that R&D investments as
a ratio of total investments tend to fall during the period when the country faces a credit
crunch but does not necessarily increase proportionally during non banking crisis periods.
Further, Booth et al (2001) suggests that long-term debt is likely to be positively associated
with asset tangibility but short-term debt is likely to be negatively associated. As exporting
activities may constitute long-term nancing, this can explain the positive e¤ect of asset
tangibility on export ow within OECD member countries during the non-crisis period. On
the other hand, in less developed countries with weaker property rights, collateral can be
seized by relatively powerful lenders in case of default payments and this may exacerbate
during a credit crunch. This can in turn reduce export ow in industries characterized by
high asset tangibility. Exporters in Pakistan can ll the vacuum of production in nancially
dependent industries in developing economies12. However, during a credit crunch, rms may
be less willing to export to industries where the importers are at a high risk of their assets
being seized by the lenders due to weak property rights. When OECD member countries
face a banking crisis, nancial dependence and asset tangibility at the industry-level do not
signicantly inuence the value of export ow from Pakistan. Therefore, this pattern can
12The onset of a banking crisis creates an output loss and lowers the supply of banking credit. As there
has been no reported banking crisis in Pakistan during the sample period, I can assume that Pakistan as an
exporting country has faced neither an output loss nor a credit crunch to the degree faced by the importing
country when it experiences a banking crisis. Therefore, the export ow from Pakistan is a¤ected but not
the domestic production. The change in the composition of the industries based on nancial factors is driven
by the demand of foreign goods in the importing countries.
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indicate that exports from Pakistan are likely to occur in any industry regardless of nancial
dependence and asset tangibility of industries as OECD members may face a credit crunch
that limits the ability of rms to generate revenue from export sales. Hence, foreign lenders
that may be su¤ering from their own decline in the ability to supply credit are less likely to
provide loans to specic industries. However, as OECD members themselves may contain
countries with both high and middle banking credit, the results in Table 7 will determine
the inuence when the group of importing countries is split according to the level of banking
credit.
Contract intensity is negative and signicant at 1% level for all set of countries except
when OECD member countries are facing a banking crisis. Capital intensity is negative and
signicant at 5% and 1% level respectively for pooled and OECD member countries not
facing a banking crisis. Human capital intensity is negative and signicant at 1% level for all
set of countries regardless of whether they face a banking crisis. Natural resource intensity
is negative and signicant at 1% level across all set of countries except for OECD member
countries facing a banking crisis. Income demand elasticity is negative and signicant be-
tween 1% level and 10% level across all set of countries and the sum of exports from lower
middle income countries is positive and signicant at 1% level across all set of countries.
Therefore, we can predict that all variables except for capital intensity is likely to inuence
export ow, either negatively of positively across all set of countries. However, when an
OECD countries faces a banking crisis, the only variables that have inuence are human
capital intensity, import demand elasticity and sum of exports from lower middle income
countries.
In Table 6, nancial dependence inuences the ratio of export ow from Pakistan to
total export ow from South Asian economies positively and signicantly at 10% level for
the pooled set of countries regardless of whether they face a banking crisis. Within OECD
member countries, the ratio is positively and signicantly inuenced at 1% level if the coun-
tries do not face a banking crisis. Within non OECD countries, the ratio is positively and
signicantly inuenced at 10% level if the countries do face a banking crisis. Asset tangibility
does not inuence the ratio across all set of countries regardless of a banking crisis. Contract
intensity inuences the ratio negatively and signicantly at 1% level for all set of countries
except for OECD member countries facing a banking crisis. Capital intensity inuences the
ratio negatively and signicantly at 5% level for pooled set of countries and non OECD
countries facing a banking crisis but inuences the ratio negatively and signicantly at 1%
level within OECD member countries not facing a banking crisis. Human capital intensity
is negative and signicant at 1% level within pooled set of countries and within non OECD
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countries not facing a crisis. Natural resource intensity is positive and signicant at 5%
level and 10% level within pooled set of countries and OECD member countries respectively.
Import demand elasticity is negative and signicant at 1% level across all set of countries
regardless of whether they face a crisis. Sum of exports from lower middle income economies
inuences the ratio negatively and signicantly at 1% level for pooled set of countries and
non OECD countries that do not face a banking crisis and negatively inuences the ratio
at 10% level within the non OECD member countries that do face a banking crisis. The
e¤ect is positive and signicant at 5% level for OECD member countries that do not face a
banking crisis.
Interestingly, the only variable to inuence the ratio within OECDmember countries that
face a banking crisis is import demand elasticity. The preference for exports from Pakistan is
not inuenced by any of the nancial characteristics at the industry-level by such countries.
Similarly, asset tangibility has no e¤ect on the preference of exports from Pakistan. Financial
dependence positively inuences the preference of export ow from Pakistan when importing
OECD member countries are not facing a banking crisis and non OECD member are facing
a banking crisis. With contract intensity having a negative inuence, the preference of
export ow from Pakistan is likely to be in industries where trade is likely to be exchanged
in a spot market. Therefore, the development of nancial markets that can promote the
growth of nancially developed industries will likely increase the preference of exports from
Pakistan given that products are exchanged in a spot market, particularly for importing
OECD member countries not facing a banking crisis and importing non OECD countries
facing a banking crisis.
In Table 7, nancial dependence positively and signicantly inuences export ow at
1% level for middle banking credit countries that do not face a banking crisis, similar
to the result observed in Table 3. Asset tangibility negatively and signicantly inuences
export ow for both high banking credit countries at 10% level and middle banking credit
countries at 5% level that face a banking crisis. The e¤ect of nancial dependence and asset
tangibility is consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Levchenko et al (2010). The
former predicts growth in nancially dependent industries as banking credit increases and
the latter reveals that the imports into the U.S. are negatively impacted by asset tangibility
during a banking crisis. With the U.S. nancial market comparable to other developed
markets with higher levels of banking credit, the relationship is expected to be similar for
other importing countries. Importers within high banking credit countries not facing a
banking crisis are likely to increase export ow from nancially dependent industries within
Pakistan. However, when such countries face a banking crisis, the credit crunch within their
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nancial markets may inuence a negative relationship between asset tangibility and export
ow. Contract intensity negatively and signicantly inuences export ow at 1% level for
all set of countries except for high banking credit and low banking credit countries facing a
banking crisis at 10% level and 5% level.
Capital intensity negatively and signicantly inuences export ow at 1% level for coun-
tries with high banking credit that do not face a banking crisis, which is similar to the result
observed in Table 3. Human capital intensity negatively and signicantly inuences export
ow at 1% level except for low bank credit countries not facing a banking crisis. Natural
resource intensity negatively and signicantly inuences export ow at 1% level for low bank
credit countries regardless of them facing a banking crisis, high banking credit countries
and middle banking credit countries not facing a banking crisis. This variable negatively
inuences high banking credit countries facing a banking crisis at 5% level and middle bank
credit countries facing a banking crisis at 10% level. Income elasticity demand negatively
and signicantly inuences export ow at 1% level for high banking credit countries and low
banking credit countries not facing a banking crisis and signicantly inuences export ow
at 5% level for the remaining group of countries. Sum of exports from lower middle income
countries positively and signicantly inuences export ow at 1% level across all group of
countries.
In Table 8, nancial dependence positively and signicantly inuences the ratio of exports
from Pakistan to the total exports from South Asian nations within high and middle banking
credit countries not facing a banking crisis at 1% and 5% level respectively. It also positively
and signicantly inuences the ratio at 10% level within low banking credit countries facing
a banking crisis. On the other hand, nancial dependence negatively and signicantly
inuences the ratio at 1% level within countries with low banking credit and are not facing
a banking crisis. Asset tangibility negatively and signicantly inuences the ratio at 10%
level within countries with high banking credit facing a banking crisis, and it positively and
signicantly inuences the ratio at 1% level within countries with low banking credit not
facing a banking crisis. In Table 8, I observe a similar relationship for nancial dependence
and asset tangibility within countries with low bank credit as observed in Table 4. With
positive inuence of nancial dependence on the ratio of exports from Pakistan to total
exports from South Asian economies within both high and middle credit countries not facing
a banking crisis and the negative e¤ect within low banking credit countries that are not facing
a banking crisis implies that loans in such industries to exporters from Pakistan are likely to
increase relative export ow from Pakistan in high and middle banking credit countries.
However, it will also decrease relative export ow from Pakistan to low banking credit
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countries during periods when the importing country is not facing a banking crisis. This
trend in relative size of exports may be explained by the level of development of the nancial
markets in Pakistan compared to other countries in the region as Pakistan on average has
one of deepest credit markets in the region characterized with large domestic lenders and
foreign lenders. The pattern of nancial markets in Pakistan is likely to attract lenders to
nance production for exports from Pakistan relative to other South Asian economies to the
developed nancial markets.
6 Conclusion
The positive inuence of nancial dependence and the negative inuence of asset tangibility
on the export value indicates that exports are likely to increase with nancial dependence of
an industry but decrease with its level of asset tangibility. Therefore, industries with more
liquidity needs and higher demand for external nance may generate greater export value.
This pattern seems to hold for importing partners with developed nancial markets, indicated
by the high and middle level of banking credit. In nancially developed countries, industries
with higher nancial dependence are likely to grow faster than the industries with lower
nancial dependence, particularly during the period when the country is not facing an episode
of a banking crisis. This relation can explain the e¤ect of industry nancial dependence on
export ow from Pakistan within nancially developed countries. Further, the inuence of
nancial dependence on the ratio of exports from Pakistan to total exports from South Asian
economies is signicant for OECD member countries and the range of countries with high
and middle banking credit during the period when such countries are not facing a banking
crisis. This indicates that the nancial market of Pakistan is likely to provide a greater
proportion of export value in industries that are more nancially dependent in economies
where markets are relatively nancially developed. However, the negative inuence of asset
tangibility when the importing country faces a banking crisis points to growth in export value
in industries that are likely to have softinformation. Lenders are willing to fund borrowers
with a lower proportion of tangible assets when the importing country is facing a banking
crisis as consumers in those industries may substitute domestically produced products with
imported products from countries that do not face a banking crisis due to the reduction in
domestic production.
Exporters in Pakistan belong to a relatively developed nancial market compared to
countries with a lower supply of banking credit and other South Asian economies. As the
importing countries with lower levels of nancial development, such as non OECD countries,
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face a banking crisis that can deteriorate the availability of credit to nancially dependent
industries as well as industries with lower asset tangibility, the probability that the collateral
of the borrower within such industries in such countries is likely to be seized by the lender
may increase. The latter reason can reduce the willingness of exporters in Pakistan to trade
with rms that are less likely to survive as lenders may seize collateral. The shortage of
credit in the importing country may allow exporters from Pakistan to ll the vacuum in
supply of products in certain industries as the less nancially developed markets are unlikely
to get nancing from lenders that prefer more robust nancial markets. However, during
periods when there is no banking crisis, the preference of exports from Pakistan is likely
to increase in industries with a greater proportion of tangible assets within countries with
low banking credit but decrease during periods of banking crisis within countries with high
banking credit. In summary, with a greater level of development in the nancial markets in
Pakistan relative to other South Asian countries, I observe a positive inuence of nancial
dependence and negative inuence of asset tangibility on the preference of exports from
Pakistan to importing countries with developed nancial markets but observe a negative
inuence of nancial dependence and a positive inuence of asset tangibility to importing
countries with less developed nancial markets. This pattern may indicate the priority of
exporters as those that have the capacity to obtain larger amounts of external funding or
possess softinformation are likely to increase the relative ow of exports to industries in
importing countries that are nancially developed.
I suggest to the policymakers that given the level of development of the nancial market
in Pakistan compared to other developing nancial markets, they should promote exports
in nancially dependent industries as well as industries with a lower proportion of tangible
assets as such industries are likely to not only increase in export value but have a positive
impact on the preference of exports from Pakistan relative to the exports from other South
Asian countries. This pattern is likely to hold for importing countries with the level of
nancial development, measured in terms of domestic credit provided by banking sector as a
percentage of GDP, that is relatively better or equal to that observed in Pakistan. Although,
the banking crisis does impact the pattern of exports from Pakistan, the nancially dependent
industries and the industries with lower asset tangibility will generate not only greater export
value but also increase the preference of exports from Pakistan relative to other South Asian
countries as importing countries tend to su¤er from macroeconomic volatility. Therefore,
it is highly imperative for Pakistan to maintain or improve the level of development in the
nancial markets that has allowed its exports to generate value, particularly in industries
that are likely to grow with the level of development in the nancial market.
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Figure 1: Average Industry-Level Bilateral Exports From Pakistan By OECD Membership
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Figure 2: Average Industry-Level Financial Dependence in Pakistan by OECD Membership
Status of Importers
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Figure 3: Average Industry-Level Asset Tangibility in Pakistan by OECD Membership Sta-
tus of Importers
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Figure 4: Average Industry-Level Bilateral Exports From Pakistan
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Figure 5: Average Industry-Level Financial Dependence in Pakistan by Banking Credit
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Figure 6: Average Industry-Level Asset Tangibility in Pakistan by Banking Credit
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Figure 7: Average Ratio of Exports From Pakistan to Exports From South Asian Economies
by OECD Membership Status of Importers
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Figure 8: Average Ratio of Exports From Pakistan to Exports From South Asian Economies
by Banking Credit
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Pooled OECD Member Non OECD
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable: Export Flow (ln)
Financial Dependence 0.32*** 0.36* 0.34**
(0.11) (0.20) (0.13)
Asset Tangibility -0.42 1.60** -0.87
(0.44) (0.61) (0.54)
Contract Intensity -1.92*** -1.45*** -2.40***
(0.21) (0.33) (0.26)
Capital Intensity -6.58** -22.82*** -1.23
(2.98) (4.35) (3.19)
Human Capital Intensity -1.87*** -1.32*** -1.76***
(0.16) (0.24) (0.18)
Natural Resource Intensity -1.44*** -1.38*** -1.50***
(0.10) (0.17) (0.13)
Import Demand Elasticity -0.09** -0.33*** -0.07**
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03)
Sum of Exports from Lower Middle 0.67*** 0.93*** 0.55***
Income Economies (ln) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Constant 1.49*** -1.48** 2.16***
(0.32) (0.58) (0.41)
Observations 31,044 10,452 20,125
R-squared 0.45 0.51 0.41
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes importer and year xed e¤ects.
Export ow and sum of exports have been adjusted at 2005 CPI
Table 1: The E¤ects of Financial Characteristics on Export Flow From Pakistan By OECD
Membership Status of Importing Countries
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(1) (2) (3)
Pooled OECD Member Non OECD
Dep. Variable: Ratio of Paks Exports
to South Asias Exports
Financial Dependence 0.02* 0.08*** -0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Asset Tangibility 0.02 -0.03 0.06
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Contract Intensity -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.15***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Capital Intensity -0.42* -1.03*** -0.37
(0.24) (0.32) (0.32)
Human Capital Intensity -0.07*** -0.00 -0.08***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Natural Resource Intensity -0.00 0.03** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Import Demand Elasticity -0.01*** -0.07*** -0.01***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Sum of Exports from Lower Middle -0.01*** 0.01** -0.02***
Income Economies (ln) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.71*** 0.18*** 0.65***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 31,044 10,452 20,125
R-squared 0.24 0.15 0.27
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes importer and year xed e¤ects.
Export ow and sum of exports have been adjusted at 2005 CPI
Table 2: The E¤ects of Financial Characteristics on Ratio of Exports From Pakistan to
Total Exports From South Asian Economies By OECD Membership Status of Importing
Countries
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(1) (2) (3)
Average Banking Credit Level: High Middle Low
Dep. Variable: Export Flow (ln)
Financial Dependence 0.02 0.50*** 0.16
(0.22) (0.18) (0.18)
Asset Tangibility 1.06 -1.14 0.46
(0.80) (0.71) (0.79)
Contract Intensity -1.81*** -2.03*** -2.02***
(0.43) (0.26) (0.42)
Capital Intensity -18.20*** -4.11 -3.37
(4.55) (4.92) (4.35)
Human Capital Intensity -1.20*** -1.97*** -1.87***
(0.16) (0.24) (0.30)
Natural Resource Intensity -1.74*** -1.09*** -1.87***
(0.20) (0.14) (0.17)
Import Demand Elasticity -0.35*** -0.06** -0.24***
(0.08) (0.03) (0.08)
Sum of Exports from Lower Middle 0.92*** 0.57*** 0.64***
Income Economies (ln) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.42 2.90*** 2.43***
(0.64) (0.71) (0.56)
Observations 8,289 14,966 7,299
R-squared 0.51 0.37 0.51
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes importer and year xed e¤ects.
Export ow and sum of exports have been adjusted at 2005 CPI
High is Greater than 75th percentile, Middle is between 75th and 25th percentile
and Low is less than 25th percentile of average banking credit
Table 3: The E¤ects of Financial Characteristics on Export Flow From Pakistan By Banking
Credit of Importing Countries
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(1) (2) (3)
Average Banking Credit Level: High Middle Low
Dep. Variable: Ratio of Paks Exports
to South Asias Exports
Financial Dependence 0.05*** 0.05** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Asset Tangibility -0.04 -0.05 0.25***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Contract Intensity -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.10*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06)
Capital Intensity -0.66** -0.37 -0.71
(0.28) (0.37) (0.62)
Human Capital Intensity -0.04 -0.07** -0.10**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Natural Resource Intensity 0.00 0.04** -0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Import Demand Elasticity -0.08*** -0.01*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Sum of Exports from Lower Middle 0.00 -0.01*** -0.02***
Income Economies (ln) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.79***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Observations 8,289 14,966 7,299
R-squared 0.21 0.23 0.29
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes importer and year xed e¤ects.
Export ow and sum of exports have been adjusted at 2005 CPI
High is Greater than 75th percentile, Middle is between 75th and 25th percentile
and Low is less than 25th percentile of average banking credit
Table 4: The E¤ects of Financial Characteristics on Ratio of Exports From Pakistan to Total
Exports From South Asian Economies By Banking Credit of Importing Countries
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OECD Member Non OECD
Banking Crisis: No Yes No Yes No Yes
Dep. Variable: Export Flow (ln)
Financial Dependence 0.32*** 0.40 0.43** -0.62 0.32** 0.76**
(0.11) (0.32) (0.19) (0.50) (0.13) (0.37)
Asset Tangibility -0.24 -3.70*** 1.78*** -1.16 -0.65 -4.77***
(0.43) (1.15) (0.61) (1.44) (0.53) (1.44)
Contract Intensity -1.89*** -2.89*** -1.50*** -0.55 -2.32*** -3.92***
(0.21) (0.57) (0.33) (0.76) (0.26) (0.61)
Capital Intensity -7.00** -5.15 -23.84*** -6.97 -1.43 -2.84
(2.98) (6.17) (4.06) (10.17) (3.20) (7.28)
Human Capital Intensity -1.83*** -1.98*** -1.25*** -2.42*** -1.73*** -1.70***
(0.15) (0.32) (0.24) (0.62) (0.18) (0.35)
Natural Resource Intensity -1.47*** -0.86*** -1.41*** -0.77 -1.52*** -0.95***
(0.10) (0.26) (0.16) (0.58) (0.13) (0.27)
Import Demand Elasticity -0.08** -0.76*** -0.30*** -0.69* -0.07** -0.74***
(0.03) (0.20) (0.06) (0.33) (0.03) (0.25)
Sum of Exports from Lower Middle 0.69*** 0.53*** 0.95*** 0.77*** 0.56*** 0.45***
Income Countries (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant 1.31*** 2.68** -1.15* 2.84** 2.80*** 4.89***
(0.32) (1.24) (0.60) (1.07) (0.56) (1.12)
Observations 29,022 2,022 9,884 568 18,676 1,449
R-squared 0.46 0.38 0.52 0.44 0.42 0.37
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes importer and year xed e¤ects
Export ow and sum of exports have been adjusted to 2005 CPI
Table 5: The E¤ects of Financial Characteristics on Export Flow From Pakistan By OECD
Membership Status and Banking Crisis of Importing Countries
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OECD Member Non OECD
Banking Crisis No Yes No Yes No Yes
Dep. Variable: Ratio of Paks Exports
to South Asias Exports
Financial Dependence 0.02* 0.07* 0.09*** 0.00 -0.01 0.09*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05)
Asset Tangibility 0.03 -0.15 -0.02 -0.20 0.07 -0.11
(0.04) (0.14) (0.06) (0.20) (0.05) (0.19)
Contract Intensity -0.12*** -0.25*** -0.13*** -0.13 -0.14*** -0.30***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Capital Intensity -0.34 -1.81** -1.05*** -0.64 -0.25 -2.27**
(0.23) (0.83) (0.30) (1.13) (0.31) (1.11)
Human Capital Intensity -0.08*** 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.09*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06)
Natural Resource Intensity -0.00 0.06* 0.03** 0.06 -0.01 0.06
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
Import Demand Elasticity -0.01*** -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.13*** -0.01*** -0.08***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
Sum of Exports from Lower Middle -0.01*** -0.01 0.01*** 0.01 -0.02*** -0.01*
Income Countries (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Constant 0.70*** 0.98*** 0.14** 0.32** 0.53*** 1.10***
(0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10)
Observations 29,022 2,022 9,884 568 18,676 1,449
R-squared 0.24 0.36 0.16 0.12 0.27 0.40
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes importer and year xed e¤ects
Export ow and sum of exports have been adjusted to 2005 CPI
Table 6: The E¤ects of Financial Characteristics on Ratio of Exports From Pakistan to Total
Exports From South Asian Economies By OECD Membership Status and Banking Crisis of
Importing Countries
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Banking Credit Level: High Middle Low
Banking Crisis: No Yes No Yes No Yes
Dep. Variable: Export Flow (ln)
Financial Dependence 0.06 -0.36 0.51*** 0.50 0.15 0.69
(0.20) (0.83) (0.18) (0.40) (0.18) (0.46)
Asset Tangibility 1.27 -3.21* -0.95 -3.70** 0.54 -1.64
(0.79) (1.68) (0.71) (1.63) (0.77) (3.58)
Contract Intensity -1.73*** -3.49* -2.03*** -2.65*** -2.02*** -2.49**
(0.42) (1.71) (0.27) (0.60) (0.42) (1.20)
Capital Intensity -19.01*** -4.95 -4.50 -4.93 -3.43 -17.52
(4.38) (6.68) (4.99) (8.71) (4.30) (16.23)
Human Capital Intensity -1.14*** -2.08*** -1.92*** -2.11*** -1.86*** -0.79
(0.17) (0.41) (0.24) (0.43) (0.30) (0.89)
Natural Resource Intensity -1.77*** -1.18** -1.10*** -0.67* -1.88*** -2.10***
(0.20) (0.48) (0.14) (0.37) (0.16) (0.61)
Import Demand Elasticity -0.31*** -0.86** -0.06** -0.72** -0.23*** -1.10**
(0.09) (0.31) (0.03) (0.29) (0.07) (0.53)
Sum of Exports from Lower Middle 0.93*** 0.74*** 0.58*** 0.49*** 0.65*** 0.51***
Income Economies (ln) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10)
Constant 0.15 3.24* 2.63*** 2.87** 1.98*** 5.32***
(0.57) (1.47) (0.71) (1.18) (0.59) (1.04)
Observations 7,862 427 13,686 1,280 6,984 315
R-squared 0.51 0.48 0.38 0.34 0.52 0.44
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes importer and year xed e¤ects.
Export ow and sum of exports have been adjusted at 2005 CPI
High is Greater than 75th percentile, Middle is between 75th and 25th percentile
and Low is less than 25th percentile of average banking credit
Table 7: The E¤ects of Financial Characteristics on Export Flow From Pakistan By Banking
Credit and Banking Crisis of Importing Countries
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Banking Credit Level: High Middle Low
Banking Crisis: No Yes No Yes No Yes
Dep. Variable: Ratio of Paks Exports
to South Asias Exports
Financial Dependence 0.05*** 0.05 0.05** 0.06 -0.07*** 0.13*
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07)
Asset Tangibility -0.01 -0.49* -0.06 -0.06 0.26*** 0.19
(0.07) (0.22) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.70)
Contract Intensity -0.16*** -0.18** -0.14*** -0.20*** -0.08 -0.67**
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.27)
Capital Intensity -0.72** 0.93* -0.27 -1.82* -0.51 -7.85**
(0.29) (0.47) (0.37) (1.06) (0.59) (3.19)
Human Capital Intensity -0.04 -0.11** -0.07*** -0.00 -0.10** 0.24
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.17)
Natural Resource Intensity 0.00 0.04 0.04** 0.05 -0.07*** 0.16
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.12)
Import Demand Elasticity -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.01*** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07)
Sum of Exports from Lower Middle 0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01 -0.02*** -0.01
Income Economies (ln) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
Constant 0.51*** 1.12*** 0.43*** -0.03 0.87*** 2.11***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.18) (0.08) (0.25)
Observations 7,862 427 13,686 1,280 6,984 315
R-squared 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.30 0.29 0.42
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes importer and year xed e¤ects.
Export ow and sum of exports have been adjusted at 2005 CPI
High is Greater than 75th percentile, Middle is between 75th and 25th percentile
and Low is less than 25th percentile of average banking credit
Table 8: The E¤ects of Financial Characteristics on Ratio of Exports From Pakistan to Total
Exports From South Asian Economies By Banking Credit and Banking Crisis of Importing
Countries
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Appendix
Appendix A
Description of Variables
Variable Definition Source
Export Flow Bilateral Export Flow at 3 digit ISIC level De Sousa et al. (2012)
Financial Dependence
Ratio of capital expenditures less cash flow from
operations to capital expenditures for a median firm in
an industry Manova (2008)
Asset Tangibility
Ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total
book value of assets for a median firm in an industry Manova (2008)
Contract Intensity
Fraction of inputs neither sold on an exchange nor
reference priced Nunn (2007)
Capital Intensity
Median of gross capital formation to value added ratio
for each industry Braun (2003)
Human Capital Intensity
Industry's mean wage over that of the whole
manufacturing sector Braun (2003)
Natural Resource Intensity
If industry includes the use of minerals and fossil fuels,
timber, non-timber forest benefits, cropland, and
pastureland as main input Braun (2003)
Import Demand Elasticity
Constructed with a GDP function, using import and
domestic prices of n  good and import shares of n good
in GDP.
Nicita and Olarreaga (2006) and
Kee et al. (2004)
Sum of Exports From Lower
Middle Income Countries
Sum of Bilateral Export Flow at 3 digit ISIC level from
Lower Middle Income Countries De Sousa et al. (2012)
Banking Credit
Domestic credit by banking sector (% of GDP) to all
sectors except central govt World Development Indicators (2012)
Banking Crisis
Two conditions need to be met: a) Significant signs of
distress in the banking system through bank runs,
liquidation and losses and b) Significant policy
intervention in response to the distress. Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Note: Financial dependence, asset tangibility, capital intensity, human capital intensity and natural resource intensity are defined
at 3 digit ISIC Rev 2 and are borrowed from US data.
Appendix A: Description of Variables
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Appendix B
OECD Member Countries
Country Name Note
Australia
Austria
Belgium-Luxemburg
Canada
Czech Republic Member since 1995
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary Member since 1996
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea Member since 1996
Mexico Member since 1994
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland Member since 1996
Portugal
Slovakia Member since 2000
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
Appendix B.1: OECD Member Countries
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Appendix B.2: Sorting Countries According to Average Banking Credit from 1980 to
2006.(High is greater than 75th percentile, Middle is between 25th and 75th percentile and
Low is less than or equal to 25th percentile).
High Banking Credit Countries: Austria, Canada, China, Cyprus, Eritrea, France,
Germany, Guyana, Hong Kong, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Malta, Netherlands,
Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United
Kingdom
Middle Banking Credit Countries: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Aruba, Australia,
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium-Luxemburg, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Re-
public, Djibouti, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Finland, Greece, Grenada, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Macao, Maldives, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Panama, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka,
Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Vietnam, Vanautu, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
Low Banking Credit Countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,
Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote DIvoire, Dem. Republic of Congo, Ecuador,
Equatorial Guinea, Fed. States of Micronesia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kazakhastan, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome
and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tan-
zania, Timor Portuguese, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
Venezuela, Yemen
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List of Lower Middle Income Economies
Defined by World Bank (2012)
Albania Moldova
Armenia Mongolia
Belize Morocco
Bhutan Nicaragua
Bolivia Nigeria
Cameroon Pakistan
Cape Verde Papua New Guinea
Congo, Rep. Paraguay
Cote d'Ivoire Philippines
Djibouti Samoa
Egypt, Arab Rep. Sao Tome and Principe
El Salvador Senegal
Fiji Solomon Islands
Georgia South Sudan
Ghana Sri Lanka
Guatemala Sudan
Guyana Swaziland
Honduras Syrian Arab Republic
India Timor-Leste
Indonesia Tonga
Iraq Ukraine
Kiribati Uzbekistan
Kosovo Vanuatu
Lao PDR Vietnam
Lesotho West Bank and Gaza
Marshall Islands Yemen, Rep.
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Zambia
Note: Lower middle income economies have a
2011 GNI per capita of $1,026- $4,035
Appendix B.3: List of Lower Middle Income Countries as Classied by the World Bank
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Appendix C
Ranking of Cumulative Bilateral Exports From Pakistan By Industry (1980-2006)
Adjusted for 2005 CPI
Ranking ISIC Rev 2 Sector Description Ranking ISIC Rev 2 Sector Description
1 321 Manufacture of textiles 14 369
Manufacture of other non-metallic
mineral products
2 322
Manufacture of wearing apparel, except
footwear 15 383
Manufacture of electrical machinery
apparatus, appliances and supplies
3 311 Food manufacturing 16 372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries
4 323
Manufacture of leather and products of
leather 17 356
Manufacture of plastic products not
elsewhere classified
5 353 Petroleum refineries 18 313 Beverage industries
6 351 Manufacture of industrial chemicals 19 314 Tobacco manufactures
7 384 Manufacture of transport equipment 20 355 Manufacture of rubber products
8 385
Manufacture of professional and scientific
equipment 21 342 Printing, publishing and allied industries
9 324 Manufacture of footwear 22 341
Manufacture of paper and paper
products
10 382 Manufacture of machinery except electrical 23 362 Manufacture of glass and glass products
11 381 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 24 361
Manufacture of pottery, china and
earthenware
12 352 Manufacture of other chemical products 25 332 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures
13 371 Iron and steel basic industries 26 331
Manufacture of wood and wood and cork
products
Appendix C.1: Ranking of Cumulative Bilateral Exports From Pakistan (1980-2006)
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Appendix D
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Appendix D.1: Correlation Between Exports From Pakistan and Regional Signicance of
Exports From Pakistan
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Appendix E
Appendix E.1: Export Flow and Banking Crisis Status of Importing Countries
Appendix E.2: Regional Signicance of Exports and Banking Crisis Status of Importing
Countries
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Appendix E.3: Industry Financial Dependence and Banking Crisis Status of Importing
Countries
Appendix E.4: Industry Asset Tangibility and Banking Crisis Status of Importing
Countries
49
Appendix F
Appendix F.1: Annual Domestic Credit of South Asian Economies
Appendix F.2: Average Domestic Credit of South Asian Economies
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